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As emphasized by Barney (1986), any explanation of superior profitability must account for why
the resources supporting such profitability could have been acquired for a price below their rent
generating capacity. Building upon the literature in economics on coordination failures and
incomplete markets, we suggest a framework for analyzing such strategic factor market
inefficiencies. Our point of departure is that a strategic opportunity exists whenever prices fail to
reflect the value of a resource’s best use. This paper examines the challenges of imputing a
resource’s value in the absence of explicit price guidance and suggests the likely characteristics
of strategic opportunities. Our framework also suggests that the discovery of strategic
opportunity is often a matter of “serendipity” and access to relevant idiosyncratic resources. This
latter observation provides prescriptive advice, although the analysis also explains why more
detailed guidance has to be firm specific.1
1. Introduction
Given that firms are distinguished by the resources they command, and that those
resources must in some ultimate sense have been acquired through purchase, how could it
happen that the purchase prices are sufficiently favorable to support superior profitability
(Barney 1986)?  Barney sets forth what might be called the “bad news” about resource valuation:
in general it is difficult to purchase things for less than they are worth.   The interests of both the
seller and rivals should stand in the way of such an accomplishment.  This paper sets forth the
good news about resource valuation: our stance is that “the good news is that the bad news is
wrong”.
1 (Or at least, the bad news is valid only within its proper sphere.)
Although Barney did not make explicit reference to the efficient markets hypothesis, his
vigorous statement of the bad news for strategy clearly has much in common with the (semi-
strong) EMH: unless you have superior (inside) information, your only chance of “beating the
market” is the same chance of having good luck that everybody has.  This argument seems to put
hurdles in the way of anyone who would presume to offer strategic advice, just as the EMH
challenges anyone who presumes to offer stock tips at a positive price. We argue, however, that
this perspective greatly overstates the degree to which market processes establish the prices of
strategically significant resources. By so doing, it understates the possibilities for uncovering
“abnormally profitable” courses of action. Barney’s acknowledged exceptions to the bad news
proposition  -- “superior information” and  “luck” – are more broadly relevant than they may
appear.
The crucial missing element in the resource valuation story is the idiosyncratic position
of the individual firm.  The view of each firm is shaped by its own existing resources and
information, including its ability to assess the resources of other firms, and is to that extent
unique.  The more distinctive the view, the more likely that such a view can encompass valuable
opportunities not similarly visible to other firms – implying at least a temporary advantage for
the firm that identifies the opportunity.  In a changing environment, there is continuing renewal
of each firm’s view of the opportunities that are differentially suited to it, even without explicit
effort to this end by the firm itself.   Whether the opportunities seen are actually seized is,
however, an important question.  We argue that the discovery of a valuable strategic opportunity
is often a matter of “serendipity” in the strict sense – not just luck, but effort and luck joined by
alertness and flexibility.
To appreciate these points it is necessary to break out of the equilibrium mindset that
dominates so much of economic theory – including, of course, the EMH. Central to our argument
is the proposition that the economic analysis of strategic opportunity at the firm level is a
problem that is intimately connected to the analysis of coordination failures in market systems.
In particular, strategic opportunities remain in situations where market prices do not reflect the
value of resources in their best use. In developing our arguments, we have the advantage of being
able to draw on some recent contributions in economic theory that offer novel perspectives on
the problem of coordination failure, particularly Makowski and Ostroy (1995) and Matsuyama
(1997).
2
                                                
1 This nice phrase is the title of a book by Ben J. Wattenberg (1984).
2  This problem, however, has a substantial previous history in several branches of the economics literature,
particularly economic development (Scitovsky 1954, Hirschman 1958) and Austrian Economics (Hayek 1945,
Kirzner 1973, 1997).  In addition, of course, there is a stream in the strategic management literature that explores the2
Our argument proceeds as follows.  In the next section, we lay out the terms of our
discussion, which is not by any means in perfect alignment with the usual treatment of these
issues in strategic management.  We then in Section 3 turn to the issue of the completeness of
markets, as it is framed in economics, and explain its relationship to the assessment of strategic
opportunities.  Section 4 explores the knowledge and learning challenges facing entrepreneurs
who attempt to value resources in the typical scenario of incomplete markets. Based on this
discussion we suggest, in Section 5, some likely characteristics of strategic opportunities and the
processes of their discovery, emphasizing the role of serendipity (which is not at all the same as
pure luck).   That observation leads to a discussion in Section 6 of the challenge of providing
helpful prescriptive advice for the quest for strategic opportunity.
2. Some Fundamentals
In this section, we discuss basic conceptual issues relating to the terms “financial
performance”, “abnormal profitability,” “resources”, “markets” and “prices” or “values”.  The
stance we take on these issues is, we believe, broadly appropriate for strategy research;
specifically and more clearly, it is appropriate for the branch of strategy research that relies
heavily on economic analysis.   In any case, it defines the ground rules for the subsequent
discussion in this paper.
Financial performance and profitability.  In the strategic management literature,
business success is generally equated with financial performance, and financial performance with
“sustained abnormal profitability.”  We accept the first of these equations as fundamental to an
economic analysis of strategy, and add the stipulation that, in the case of corporations, we are
talking about the financial performance realized by shareholders.  We have, however, serious
reservations concerning the meaning and appropriateness of the second equation.  The language
of “sustained profitability” suggests both that the performance we should be concerned with is a
flow concept – so much per period – and also that the duration of the flow is a uniquely
important consideration.  Neither of these suggestions is easily reconciled with basic economic
principles.  Financial markets typically provide abundant opportunities for transforming wealth
stocks into income flows and vice versa.  That being the case, it is presumably a second order
consideration (at most) whether a wealth increase created by a business initially appears in the
form of a one-time gain or of the establishment of a claim on a flow extending into the future.
Considerations of capital market imperfection, stock market efficiency, tax law, and --we are
recently reminded-- accounting rules are in practice significant for these transformations, but
they are hardly substantial enough to legitimate an exclusive focus on flow profitability.
The notion of “sustainability,” is, on the face of it, relevant only to the flow version of
profitability.  It is true, of course, that a longer stream of excess returns has a greater net present
value (NPV); in that sense a sustainable success is more desirable, other things equal.  Similarly,
a higher rate of excess return, or a larger asset base on which the return is earned, is more
desirable.  While there are clearly important strategic issues associated with the challenge of
                                                                                                                                                            
links between the general problem of sustainable advantage and the valuation issues that Barney raised.  Some
notable early contributions were those of Barney (1986), Dierickx and Cool (1989), and reply by Barney (1989).
More recent contributions include, for example, Makadok and Barney (2001).  We have, therefore, a rich store of
prior contributions on which to draw; indeed, we have only hinted here at how rich it really is.  In developing our
argument, we attempt to give due acknowledgment to many of these prior contributions and points of contact, but
our coverage is far from exhaustive.  For the sake of the clarity and brevity of the argument, we forbear to explore
the many interesting and relevant side trails that the literature suggests.3
sustaining a profitable position over a longer period of time, there is no particular reason to grant
these considerations a distinctive place relative to considerations bearing on the other two
dimensions of a positive NPV opportunity.
3
Our view is that net present value – or expected net present value, where risk is involved
– is the basic measure of success in the quest for strategic opportunity.  It is “basic” in the sense
that it stands at the limit set by Einstein’s famous dictum that “everything should be made as
simple as possible, but not simpler.”  It is possible to employ more general or sophisticated
measures than NPV, and to invoke NPV in more sophisticated ways.  It is difficult to make basic
economic sense with a simpler analytical apparatus than the NPV concept provides.  Hence, our
discussion of “strategic opportunity” relates to opportunities for positive NPV undertakings, with
merit understood to be measured by the amount of NPV.
In taking this “basic” economic approach, we set aside some considerations, such as
organizational survival, which might make something other than the NPV of an isolated
opportunity matter to management.  We also set aside more important complications associated
with the long-term interdependencies among opportunities that arise from, and affect the
development of, the same set of underlying capabilities and competences.
Resources and resource valuation.  From the start, it has been clear that the concept of
“resources” in the resource-based view is extremely expansive.
4 This expansiveness and
flexibility has contributed to the success of the RBV, since it leaves diverse researchers free to
operationalize the concept of resources in ways they consider appropriate for their particular
undertakings.   The expansiveness of the concept can, however, give rise to confusion where
resource valuation is concerned.  This hazard can be reduced by making a key distinction within
the broad concept of resources.
The class of “resources” includes objects that are considerably more complex than the
sorts of assets that are typically traded, though it clearly includes the latter as well.  Accordingly,
let “commodity resources” refer to the sorts of roughly standardized assets typically traded in
identifiable markets -- the sorts of resources where there exist many units that are at least rough
functional substitutes for each other – bushels of wheat, a super-computer, years of Ph.D.
chemist time, an urban street corner in a high-traffic area.  The complementary subclass of
“complex resources” would include, by contrast, teams with lots of experience working together,
factory buildings with permanent fixtures and diverse types of equipment that are costly to move,
customized pieces of equipment derived from standardized ones by physical modifications that
are costly to reverse.  As these examples suggest, complex resources are typically created by
bringing together commodity resources and, in effect, sinking some costs that have the effect of
modifying them or connecting them to each other in ways that are at least semi-irreversible.
Economically speaking, the connection makes productive performances possible with the
complex resource that is not possible for the commodity resources individually.  A rival firm that
would like to have the advantages of the complex resource therefore has a choice between a)
buying or hiring the constituent commodities and trying to build the resource itself, or b) buying
                                                
3 The emphasis on flow profitability is most misleading when the flow itself is an artifact of accounting conventions,
such as valuing assets at historical cost – or at zero, because they were expensed.  This point has been argued
elsewhere (Winter 1995).
4 See Wernerfelt 1984, whose definition extends even to disadvantageous attributes.  The one thing that is quite clear
about resources is that they are firm-level attributes—abandon that, and the whole point of the RBV is lost.4
or hiring the whole thing from a firm that already possesses it – or at least, a big enough piece of
the whole thing so that the fruits of the previous owner’s “connection” investments are largely
captured.
The distinction just developed has important implications for resource valuation.  For
commodity resources, it is reasonable to say that a market exists and that a price is at least
roughly determined in that market.   True, the resources in a category like urban street corners
are not homogeneous; it takes substantial expertise to be a competent trader  -- but relevant
comparisons are in fact possible, and the expertise to make them exists in many individuals or
firms.
Complex resources, by contrast, tend to be heterogeneous in a more significant way;
individual examples may even be “unique.” Such resources are idiosyncratic to a degree that
makes valuation problematic. Idiosyncrasy arises from various sources, the most elementary
being the paucity of examples within a class of rough functional substitutes and a short history of
transacting in such things.   The paucity of examples is partly a mathematical implication of the
character of complex resources as combinations of commodity resources; the number of possible
combinations is large.  Beyond that, idiosyncrasy arises from long and path-dependent processes
of resource creation (Levinthal 1997), in which an accumulation of contingencies and choices
made under uncertainty can lead to major differences in the results of similarly-intentioned
creation attempts.  Finally, complex resources often have some attributes that are hidden from
external observers/ potential buyers, and some may be hidden from owners/ potential sellers as
well.  Both information asymmetry and symmetric ignorance are prevalent – the latter
contributing to the potential buyers’ concern that the former may exist.  All of these
considerations imply thin, highly imperfect markets for strategic resources when indeed there are
markets at all (Akerlof 1970, Dierickx and Cool 1989).
These considerations do not, of course, rule out a purely cost-based approach to
valuation.   With some effort it is possible to measure the investment involved in the creation of
a particular complex resource, although the result is partly determined by luck.  Cost data,
however, clearly cannot answer by themselves the question of what the resource is worth.  The
demand-side information is missing.
3. Market Completeness and Strategic Search
Following Barney’s terminology (Barney 1986), an efficient strategic factor market can
be defined as a market where there would be no arbitrage opportunities to be gained by acquiring
some combination of resources and selling this combination for a higher price than the cost of
the individual resources. Rather, the price of each resource would reflect its value in all possible
uses.  In an exchange economy without markets such a condition would seem to require
omniscience: there has to be someone who has considered the value of each resource in all
possible uses. However, one of the main theoretical claims for the price system is precisely that
such knowledge is not required (Hayek, 1945). Specifically, even if knowledge is decentralized
and each agent only knows about the possibility of some transformations, prices emerging from
competitive equilibrium will reflect the value of goods in their best use (Koopmans 1957).
The efficiency properties that are theoretically established for competitive markets,
however, depend on those markets being complete (Debreu 1959). At the formal level,
completeness demands not only that every commodity in the system has a corresponding market
and market price, but more, that every interaction among the agents of the system must be
represented by some commodity so that it may be mediated by markets. When this is5
(hypothetically) the case, the prices determined by competitive markets preclude any arbitrage
opportunities. In reality, however, markets are massively incomplete (Stiglitz, 1993). Even in the
case of familiar types of assets, markets do not exist in the full profusion that economic theory
contemplates, with distinctions fully made according to date of availability and “state of the
world”. Markets are more dramatically lacking for most potential products and services,
including the innumerable types of complex resources that could be created out of existing
resources.
As emphasized by recent contributions, such incompleteness has important consequences
for the efficiency of competitive prices (Makowski and Ostroy 1995; Matsuyama 1997) and for
the possibility of successful strategic search. In particular, goods with a positive price in an
economy with complete markets may have zero prices in an economy with incomplete markets
and decentralized knowledge (Makowski and Ostroy, 1995). The simplest way to illustrate this is
to perform a thought experiment in which we arbitrarily remove a subset of all existing goods
and recalculate equilibrium prices.  Suppose we withdrew Southwest Airlines. That is, we
imagine that Southwest Airlines does not exist and thus that its demand and supply vectors are
not incorporated in the calculation of the competitive equilibrium. A competitive equilibrium
without Southwest Airlines would differ substantially with respect to the prices of several
resources, such as gates at smaller airports and perhaps also hotels and infrastructure around
smaller airports.
Of course, if someone realized that these resources might command a high price due to
possibility of executing a strategy like that of Southwest Airlines, their prices would still remain
high even if markets were incomplete. But there is a huge difference between theory and reality
with respect to the information that underlies this result. In the theoretical model with complete
markets, resource owners would not need to know why and in what way resources would
ultimately be valuable for consumers to realize their value. Prices in competitive markets would
communicate this information (Hayek, 1945). As a result, in complete markets, simple profit
calculations based on existing prices would suffice for locating profitable opportunities
(Koopmans 1957). In incomplete markets, however, there can be no guarantee that profit
calculations based on price signals will identify the set of valuable opportunities (Makowski and
Ostroy, 1995). Price signals would only be sufficient if all untraded goods were useless and thus
had no effect on the prices of traded goods. While it is undoubtedly true that many currently
untraded goods are probably useless, in incomplete markets this cannot be guaranteed unless
there is somebody who has examined and rejected every possible use of these goods. For the
innumerable bad ideas as well as for the occasional good opportunities, actors typically need to
look beyond the price system in an effort to fill out their assessments of their prospects.
The proposition that truly deserves a serious claim on our attention, and that Barney
correctly highlighted, is much weaker than the claim that the market always has the price right.
It says that existing resources are correctly valued in relation to their existing uses.  If that is the
case, then valuable strategic opportunities cannot be found unless some element of novelty is
introduced into the situation – either new resources, or new uses for existing resources; since the
latter usually involves the creation of new complex resources it is typically the same thing as the
former.  There are reasons to quibble even about this weaker claim, but the quibbles are nothing
compared to the objections to the radical extension of the claim to all resources.  We will
therefore set the quibbles aside and stipulate:  in the absence of an element of novelty in the
creation and use of resources, strategic opportunities that yield an abnormally high return do not
exist.6
We should not, however, fall into the trap of presuming that the required novelty is
necessarily some new-to-the-Earth technical innovation.  Coordination failure caused by
incomplete markets means that opportunity can inhere in novel combinations of existing
resources, even if all the pieces remain familiar in their new relationship to each other.  It is this
fact that makes the image of an “arbitrage opportunity” valuable in the strategy context –
sometimes the opportunity remains available not because the arbitrage is complex per se, or
because of a lack of inventive genius, but because its feasibility was simply hidden by market
incompleteness.  Schumpeter was on target with his broad characterization of innovation as “new
combinations” and his inclusion of new ways of organization in his list of types (Schumpeter
1934).
Now novelty, per se, is cheap.  The world of “unactualized possibles”(Quine 1961,
chapter 1) is always very large, and it doesn’t take much to actualize some of them.  Hence,
meeting this necessary condition for the existence of valuable strategic opportunities is not really
a problem.  The real problem is that any such valuable opportunities are needles in a haystack of
mistakes, and they are hard to locate.  But that is not the same thing as saying that they do not
exist, or that searching for them is somehow an ex ante breakeven proposition regardless of the
search methods applied or the attributes of the searcher.
In summary, a realistic appraisal of market systems compels recognition that markets are
incomplete, and drastically so in the domain of currently untried activities. As a result, since the
value of existing activities may depend on untried activities, it cannot be guaranteed that existing
activities are priced correctly. Thus, when markets are incomplete, the prices prevailing in an
apparent equilibrium do not preclude the existence of valuable unexploited opportunities. To
exclude strategic arbitrage, a much stronger condition than market-clearing prices is necessary –
we might call it “exhaustive entrepreneurship.”  It would have to be that for each good, traded or
untraded, there has to be someone who has considered the value of this good in all possible uses.
As discussed in the next section, such a condition imposes a massively implausible information
requirement on the actors in the system. Moreover, although actors can probably learn to identify
the value of some of these resources, we argue that the local and decentralized character of the
learning process implies that certain strategic opportunities are likely to remain. The challenges
of the learning process also suggest some clues about the likely characteristics of such remaining
opportunities.
4. Valuation of Complex Resources: The Challenge of Imputation
To illustrate the challenges of valuation in the absence of price guidance and the limits to
“exhaustive entrepreneurship”, we consider a simple example of a multistage production chain
with several intermediate goods, as depicted in Figure 1. In this example, there are two basic
commodities that can be transformed into two complex resources, which, in turn, eventually can
be transformed into a specific consumption good. For simplicity, we assume that all
transformations only require the use of undifferentiated labor. If a unit of labor can be bought at
a price of W, the cost of transforming one unit of a resource i into one unit of a resource j, Ci,j is
then WLi,j, where Li,j is the units of labor required to transform one unit of resource i into one
unit of resource j.  We assume that all prices are in present value terms, so that profitability
calculations are automatically NPV calculations.  Finally, we assume that one unit of the
consumption good can be sold in a competitive market at a price of P.
In this simple economy, what is the “value” of complex resources, such as resource #4?
According to the “full imputation” principle in economics (Triffin 1949; Winter 1987), a proper
economic valuation of a resource would be one that precisely accounts for the returns that this7
resource makes possible. In this example, this principle implies that the “value” of one unit of a
resource is the maximal revenue that could be obtained by transforming one unit of this resource
into other resources and eventually into the consumption good.
Calculating this value is easy for a resource i that can be directly transformed into the
consumption good, i.e., into resource #1. In this case, its value, Vi, is simply P - Ci,1. To
calculate the value of resources that cannot be directly transformed into the consumption good,
however, we must identify the maximal revenue that could be obtained by transforming this
resource into alternative resources that, in turn, are transformed into the consumption good. For
example, resource #4 could be transformed both into resources #2 and #3. The revenues that
could be obtained in both of these alternative transformations need to be compared to identify the
value of resource #4. More generally, to calculate the value, Vi, of a resource i we need to find
the maximum of P - Σ Ck,j for all possible sequences by which this resource could be transformed
into the consumption good, where the k,j pairs define a sequence like (i,5), (5,2), (2,1).
Both computationally and conceptually it is useful to formulate this problem within a
dynamic programming framework. In this formulation, the objective is to find the most valuable
transformation of a given resource. To find this, we need to consider both the immediate costs of
transformation, Ci,j, and the value of the resources produced,  directly and indirectly.   If we
define Vi as the value of resource i, it then follows from the principle of optimality in dynamic
programming (Bellman 1957), that the value of any resource i must satisfy the following
equation system
Vi = max j {- Ci,j + Vj}, i = 2,3,...,  j = 1,2,3,... (1)
V1 = P
Here the maximum is taken over all possible resources j that the resource i can be transformed
into.  As is typical in dynamic programming, the solution to the problem for a particular starting
point entails its solution for all possible starting points.
It can be shown (e.g., Bather 2000) that there are values Vi , i = 2,3,...., that constitute the
unique solution to this system of equations. In practice, the solution to this system of equations is
found by backwards induction. Given that we know the value of the consumption good, V1 = P,
we can find the values of all resources #2 and #3, which can be directly transformed into the
consumption good by computing V2 = P - C2,1 and  V3 = P - C3,1. Using the recursive equation
(1), the values of the resources that can be transformed into #2 and #3, i.e., #4 and #5, can then
be found by finding the maximum of - C4,j + Vj and - C5,j + Vj for j = 2,3. Note that this
procedure and the above equations would be formally identical if the costs or the price of the
consumption good were stochastic. In this case, Ci,j and Vi should simply be interpreted as
expected values.
We think of this as the calculation of an entrepreneur considering a course of action, and
the question is how the prices relate to the market prices he sees.  It is clear that if market prices
were identical to the values computed in the above way, the strategic factor market would be
efficient in the sense that there could be no profit obtained by acquiring some resources and
employing them in this particular alternative use. Rather, in this scenario the price of a resource
would precisely account for the maximal revenue that a unit of this resource would make
possible in all conceivable usages. Market prices would correspond to the principle of full
imputation. This also implies that the profit that could be gained by acquiring any resource,
transforming it into another resource, and selling the output would be zero (or less). To see this,
notice that the equation Vi = - Ci,j + Vj, which holds for the most profitable transformation of i,
can be rearranged as Vj  - (Vi + Ci,j ) = 0, which states the price that can be obtained for8
transforming i into j, Vj, is equal to the cost of acquiring i and transforming i into j, Vi + Ci,j.
Again, the same analysis holds if costs or the price of the consumption good were stochastic. In
this case, expected profitability would be zero. Finally, if market prices corresponded to this
ideal, no knowledge about the set of possible transformations in the economy would be required
to identify the best use of a resource. Rather, an owner of resource i would simply need to
compare the values of - Ci,j + Vj for all possible resources j that i can be transformed into. In
other words, local, myopic profitability comparisons would be sufficient to identify the optimal
use of a resource (Koopmans 1957).
On the other hand, if the entrepreneur’s dynamic programming calculation results in
values that differ from the market values, some opportunity for profit exists.  Assuming this
incentive leads to action, the apparent equilibrium will be broken.   The full system is in
equilibrium relative to existing entrepreneurial knowledge only when every entrepreneur,
calculating in this way for every possible course of action, finds no profit opportunity.
Now, it can be demonstrated that equilibrium prices in complete markets, would
correspond to the values computed in the above way (Dorfman, Samuelson and Solow, 1958).
However, as discussed above, when markets are incomplete, market prices may not correspond
to the values computed in the above way unless there are some individuals with knowledge about
the value of resources. The necessary knowledge may be vast. For example, suppose that
resources #4 and #2 are not traded. It is then clear that the market price of resource #6 cannot be
expected to reflect the value of transforming resource #6 into #4, and via resource #2 into the
consumption good. As discussed previously, only if some individual knew about the possibility
of this transformation would this usage get reflected in the price of resource #6. In other words,
valuation in incomplete markets depends crucially on the knowledge economic agents have
about alternative transformations. Although the discovery of alternative possibilities may be
simple in this case, it is easy to imagine much more complex scenarios where resource #6 could
be transformed into many different, currently untraded, resources, which each could eventually
be transformed into many other resources, etc.
To be capable of accurate calculations of this sort, an entrepreneur would require not only
vast computational capacity but, more important, extensive knowledge of the transformations
that are possible in the economy. Obviously, in many cases, individuals do not have immediate
access to this knowledge. This raises the important question of how resources are valued in
incomplete markets. In particular, when and for what types of resources can economic agents, on
the basis of search and learning from experience, determine the value of resources and thus
recognize any arbitrage opportunities? Formulated differently: when will the condition of
“exhaustive entrepreneurship” be satisfied? Formally, this learning challenge is equivalent to the
problem of learning to identify the value function of a large dynamic programming problem
without initial knowledge of the set of possible transitions or the costs and rewards associated
with each transition. In contrast to simple examples of experiential learning, such a learning
problem has some special features that make it especially challenging (Samuel, 1959; Holland
1998; Sutton and Barto, 1998; Denrell, Fang and Levinthal 2002). In particular, as the above
Bellman equations show, the value of a resource i depends on the value of the resources j that are
possible to produce with i. Formally, Vi = max j {- Ci,j + Vj}. Similarly, the values of the
resources j depend on the values of the resources k that j can be transformed into, i.e., ∀ j: Vj =
max k {- Cj,k + Vk}. This sequential interdependency implies that simple comparisons of the
values of - Ci,j + Vj, based on experience, will be misleading, unless Vj are correctly assigned,
which, in turn, requires that Vk are correctly assigned, etc.9
Such sequential interdependency implies that identifying the value of certain types of
resources, on the basis of experience, is very difficult. Consider, for example, the attempts of a
firm to value a specific resource i in its possession. Even if this firm knows the value, as assessed
by other firms in the economy, of employing resource i in alternative usages, this information
may not be sufficient to derive the value of the resource. It is possible that if these other firms
changed their production methods and valuations, resource i would be much more valuable.
The implication of this challenge of learning is that while individual firms might not see
any possibilities for improvement in the way they use their resources, arbitrage opportunities
may still exist that involve related changes in how several different resources are used.
Resources that would only be valuable if the way in which existing resources are used changes
substantially might be believed to be worthless. Only if all of these changes occurred
simultaneously would the value of such a resource be discovered.
An illustrative metaphor for this path-dependent process of valuation is that of a search in
a rugged landscape generated by all possible combinations of resource allocations (Kauffman
1993; Matsuyama 1997). Given the existing pattern of resource allocation, a firm might be able
to spot an arbitrage opportunity involving an incremental change in the way certain resources are
used. The pattern of resource allocation would thus be changed. This process will continue until
no new arbitrage opportunities from incremental changes in the pattern of resource allocation
can be spotted. However, the resulting equilibrium need not be a global optimum, or, more
precisely, a Pareto optimum. Rather, to reach this optimum, it may be necessary to make large
simultaneous changes in the pattern of resource allocation involving, perhaps, all economic
agents. While such coordinated experiments could be imagined on a limited scale, they would
obviously be infeasible as applied to large parts of the economy.
5
5. The Character of Strategic Opportunity
The Architecture of Strategic Opportunities. Based on the above discussion of market
incompleteness and the challenge of imputation, it is possible to say something about when and
for what type of resources strategic opportunities may be located.  As emphasized by Shleifer
(2000), any systematic theory of market inefficiency, which simultaneously acknowledges the
competitive forces that push markets towards efficiency, needs to answer when and why
inefficiencies can occur and remain in the presence of competitive forces and the search for
arbitrage opportunities.
 The above arguments suggest that part of the answer lies in the complex, combinatorial,
character of strategic opportunities. Specifically, it is unlikely that a valuable strategic
opportunity can be seized simply by trading in existing resources. It is much more likely that a
strategic opportunity can be found if the strategy involves trading in resources whose values are
contingent upon one or several other resources being used in a new or different way, including
the creation of novel types of complex resources.  Unless several other actors have already
recognized the opportunity and acted, resource values will not be aligned with the new uses.  If
                                                
5 This perspective on the process of valuation differs in important aspects from the discussion about the “market
process” in Austrian economics (Kirzner 1973). In Austrian economics it is often argued that the activities of profit-
seeking entrepreneurs imply that there is a tendency for the economy to converge to an equilibrium in which no
arbitrage opportunities exist. The underlying idea is that profit-seeking entrepreneurs will take advantage of
arbitrage opportunities whenever they are observed. As a result, at least in a stationary economy without
technological change, the supply of arbitrage opportunities will eventually be depleted. However, the above
arguments suggest that this view is incomplete. Unless all resources, except for one, are used in their most valuable
usages, it is not clear that arbitrage will lead the economy “closer” to a state in which no arbitrage opportunities,
incremental or large, exist.10
these other resources are of an entirely different character or used by a completely different set of
firms, identifying such an opportunity can be very challenging. Thus, there can be no
presumption that this has already occurred.
This does not imply, however, that it would necessarily take a heroic effort to identify
such opportunities. If a firm has preferential access to the missing piece of the puzzle, identifying
the opportunity might be easy.
6   In general, firms can be expected to differ considerably in the
information they possess, even in the absence of deliberate effort to create the sorts of
informational advantages that Barney referred to.   Such differences in information – and
differences in complementary assets – typically imply differences in positioning relative to new
opportunities.  Thus, in contrast to financial markets where blatant arbitrage opportunities are
rare, we submit that the discovery of strategic opportunities is a normal occurrence in the product
markets.
This characterization of strategic opportunities can also be used to shed some light on the
debate between Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Barney (1989), regarding the issue of tradability
and the strategic factor market argument. In the introduction of their article, Dierickx and Cool
argued that there is an important set of resources, including a reputation for quality and expertise
regarding complicated production processes, which cannot be bought and sold on any existing
market. These examples are of course illustrative of what we have labeled “complex resources.”
In his response, Barney emphasized that tradability, per se, was not at issue. Rather, the point is
that for any strategy to provide abnormal returns, the resources involved need to be acquired or
developed at a cost that is lower than their eventual rent producing capacity. Although we agree
with Barney on this point, we suggest that Dierickx and Cool’s point is important for evaluating
when resources could potentially be undervalued. Essentially, for the class of resources discussed
by Dierickx and Cool, markets are incomplete. Moreover, the values of the complex resources
discussed by Dierickx and Cool, such as corporate reputations, are typically contingent upon
how other resources are used. For example, the value of the reputation of Southwest Airlines
depends, to a large extent, on the idiosyncratic feature of the activities of Southwest Airlines. As
emphasized above, in such situations, strategic opportunities are possible, although not
guaranteed. Restated in this way, the argument of Dierickx and Cool suggests a class of
resources whose values are very difficult to identify and thus could represent a strategic
opportunity.
How Opportunities are Discovered.  Given that a firm has found a strategic
opportunity, what are the likely characteristics of the process by which it was discovered? The
above discussion about the nature of strategic opportunities also has some implications for this
question. Specifically, we argue that the character of the strategic opportunity implies that the
process is likely to have been serendipitous, in the strict sense of that term.  That is, success is a
consequence of effort and luck joined by alertness and flexibility, where the effort was not
initially directed to the specific end realized, alertness is required to recognize the lucky
appearance of a new possibility and flexibility is displayed in re-directing t the effort.
In the strategy process literature several examples exist detailing how profitable strategies
have emerged as a byproduct of activities with a different purpose rather than as an intended
outcome of a deliberate search process (Mintzberg 1978). Consider, for example, the well-known
story of how Honda entered and eventually came to dominate the market for small motorbikes in
the United States. According to Pascale (1984), Honda's initial plan was to focus on large
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motorbikes, which were considered to be more appropriate for the United States than the small
motorbikes sold in Japan. However, when members of the staff used the small motorbikes for
their own needs, comments from bystanders made them realize the potential demand for small
motorbikes.
While such examples of accidental discovery may seem to be unlikely, we argue that the
character of strategic opportunities implies that they should be expected in accounts of business
success. More precisely, we argue that given that a strategic opportunity is only first discovered
after some time, the discovery of this strategic opportunity is likely to have been serendipitous.
The argument is that if there has been some search for strategic opportunities, the low-hanging
fruits are likely to have been picked.  It is therefore likely that the remaining strategic
opportunities will likely consist of a complex combination of many commodities, or are
otherwise hard to recognize. At the same time, the fact that the strategic opportunity was actually
discovered suggests that it cannot have been too complex (Schoemaker 1990). It must have been
possible, for at least some firm, to spot the opportunity without the need to combine the
knowledge possessed by a wide variety of individuals.
These two observations suggest that the firm that did spot the opportunity must, for some
reason, already have been in possession of several of the necessary components. The reason is
the same as emphasized by Simon in his discussion of the evolution of complexity (Simon 1962,
1969). A complex system is unlikely to emerge if it requires that numerous elements are
simultaneously combined. It is much more likely to emerge if it can be assembled via existing
subsystems. In this case, the evolution of the system does not hinge upon the chance event that
all necessary components emerged simultaneously in the right combination. Applied to the
context of opportunity recognition, Simon’s argument suggests that it is much more likely that an
opportunity that requires a complex combination of commodities would be discovered if it could
be assembled using subsystems that were already available since they were considered valuable
by themselves.  Also, it is more likely in proportion as more of those subsystems are known to a
single firm.
At the same time, for the opportunity to still remain at a given date, the subsystems must
either be unavailable or not considered valuable by most firms, or it would already have been
discovered. Rather, it is likely that the necessary subsystems were only available to or considered
valuable by the firm that discovered the opportunity. There are, at least, four possible reasons for
this. First, only this firm had the strategic insight into the eventual value of these subsystems.
Second, by deviating from existing practice, only this firm had the complementary set of
activities that made these subsystems valuable. Third, this firm is “pre-adapted”; it was endowed
with the subsystems by its previous history, for reasons unrelated to their application in the new
opportunity (Cattani, 2002).  Fourth, this firm made a mistake and thought that these subsystems
were valuable by themselves even if all reasonable firms would agree that they were not.
Although all of these reasons are possible, we suggest that the complex character of the strategic
opportunity makes the first reason less likely than the others. Furthermore, although mistakes are
not uncommon, we would argue that the second reason and third reasons are the most important.
Overall, this argument suggests that strategy process leading up to the discovery of a
strategic opportunity is likely to have had the following characteristics. By deviating from
existing practices, perhaps by intentionally choosing an unusual strategy or by necessity due to a
lack of resources required to compete in the established manner, a firm develops a set of
idiosyncratic resources. Although perhaps not very valuable by themselves, these resources12
could be used profitably in combination with other resources. By being the only firm with access
to these components the firm is thus much more likely to discover the value of this combination.
What is the role of strategizing and intentionality in this story? According to the
argument it is unlikely that the firm acquired most of the necessary components based on some
vision of the value of the eventual combination. In this sense, the process of opportunity
recognition is serendipitous, i.e., the opportunity was discovered as an unintended outcome of
activities with another purpose. Nevertheless, it is likely that intentionality entered the story at
some point in time. Specifically, when many of the necessary components were available to the
firm, it is possible that the value of eventual combination could be foreseen. The process is
analogous to an individual facing a jigsaw puzzle with only a few lacking pieces. Even if the
individual did not have any idea of the final picture, and thus initially could not be guided by any
picture of the final outcome, when most pieces were assembled he or she would nevertheless be
able to guess the final picture and thus the color and pattern of the final pieces. In a similar way,
when a firm has assembled many of the necessary components, it may be able to see that these
resources could be valuable if complemented with some others. As a result, the search for the last
components will be intentional rather than serendipitous.
This characterization also suggests that there may be little to learn from examining the
strategy process of successful firms.  At least for firms that discovered path-breaking strategic
opportunities it is likely that they deviated from established practice by necessity or mistake
rather than as part of a plan. To assemble the components required for spotting a path-breaking
strategic opportunity, a firm needs to have assembled several components that individually are
believed to be of little value. As a result, the firm needs to engage in an unusual amount of
exploration. To be motivated to do so, a firm may need to be forced to adopt some of the
elements or may need to adopt them by mistake (Denrell and March 2001). If this is so, the
strategic opportunities of the most successful firms are likely to have developed through a
process that it would be unwise to try.
The Role of Ex Post Limits to Competition.  Using Peteraf’s terminology, our focus so
far has been on the limits to ex ante competition (Peteraf 1993). However, even if an individual
is able to spot a strategic opportunity, exploiting the opportunity will not necessarily lead to
positive NPV unless there are ex post limits to competition.  Nevertheless, although ex post
limits are necessary, it could be argued that in many cases the conditions for limited ex ante
competition may be the most important.
First, to extract the rents made possible by a new combination of goods, this combination
does not necessarily have to be protected by ex post limits to competition such as patents. As
pointed out by Hirshleifer (1971), being in possession of unique information, the entrepreneur
could potentially extract a large part of the rents by speculating in financial and product markets.
Hirshleifer offers the example of Eli Whitney, the inventor of the cotton gin. The cotton gin had
obvious speculative implications for the price of cotton, the value of cotton cropland, etc. Since
Eli Whitney was the first in the know, Hirshleifer (1971) suggests that he possessed an
“unparalleled opportunity for speculative profit” (p. 571). Although it is unclear whether such
gains can always be obtained and if they would match the gains from obtaining a patent, this
argument nevertheless suggests that isolating mechanisms are not necessary for the discoverer of
a strategic opportunity to extract some part of the rents.
7 Of course, in this case the discovery
                                                
7 It is thus interesting that one of the tenets of the resource-based view, that isolating mechanisms are necessary for
extracting the rents made possible by the discovery of a strategic opportunity, was refuted 15 years before the
emergence of RBV.13
will not lead to sustained above normal returns, in the sense that the firm has above normal
returns during the long period in which the cotton gin is used. Rather, the gains will be received
almost immediately.
Second, in many cases where the above argument is inapplicable, being the first in the
know may enable an entrepreneur to create limits to ex post competition. Thus, in this sense, ex
post limits to competition may be a direct outcome of ex ante limits to competition. Several
examples of such situations have been outlined in the literature, including investments in over-
capacity to deter entrants (Dixit 1980) and tying up favorable locations and suppliers (Porter
1980).  In these cases, ex post limits to competition are a direct implication of ex ante limits to
competition and sustained competitive advantage would entirely be explained by the conditions
for limited ex ante competition. This importance of this argument should not be exaggerated,
however. As the empirical literature on first-mover advantages has shown, it is far from clear
that the first-mover will come to dominate an industry or a product market (Teece 1987;
Lieberman and Montgomery 1988; Chandler 1990; Vanderwerf and Mahon 1997; Lieberman
and Montgomery 1998).
Even if both of these arguments do not apply, it still follows from the strategic factor
market argument that any explanation of above average profitability is incomplete unless it is
specified how the firm in question was able to acquire its resources for a price below their rent
generating capacity. While ex post limits are sometimes necessary, they are never sufficient. This
also implies that empirical hypotheses regarding when above average profitability is possible are
incomplete if they only rely on the conditions for ex post limits to competition. To identify when
a positive NPV opportunity exists one also needs to specify when strategic factor markets can be
expected to be inefficient. The present paper is an initial attempt in this direction.
6. Conclusions – and Tentative Prescriptions
While the main focus of this paper is descriptive rather than normative, there are
nevertheless some useful normative perspectives that follow from this analysis.
To be clear, we emphasize that we fully accept Barney’s “bad news” message in relation
to the likely results from purchasing existing resources and continuing them in their existing use
(Barney 1986). In a quest for superior profitability, such an action is a simple bet on getting
good luck in the form of a generous mistake by the seller and by possible rival bidders.  While
such mistakes can happen, the logic of the situation is that a “lemons”-type mistake by the buyer
is more likely. We also accept that, in practice, the relevance of Barney’s skeptical message
reaches well beyond the narrow domain of simple asset transfers, and extends in particular to
mergers and acquisitions. It is widely recognized that gains derived from synergies and
efficiencies, regularly promised in the rhetoric of corporate acquirers and investment banks, are
often times illusory – or over-compensated by the anti-synergies and diseconomies that weren’t
mentioned. What is curious is that this now-familiar, plausible and well-supported message
seems eternally fresh to the investment community.
No doubt there are also many areas of potential activity where entrepreneurial scrutiny is
sufficiently intense so that it is reasonable to assume that few valuable opportunities have gone
unnoticed.  The expected gains from further search in such areas may well be negative. This,
however, can hardly be true generally: the range of things that have not been tried is simply too
vast.  If some areas are mined out, while in others the valuable claims are carefully staked and
guarded, it is not because there is no virgin territory to search.  It is because the searchers stay
within the fences of their ideas, particularly their shared ideas.  The farther we move from the
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domain of existing resources applied in existing uses, the less presumption there is that resources
are in any sense correctly priced, or priced at all.  Moreover, as we have shown, the shadow of
pricing failure in remote regions is cast into the domain of existing resources, because it is only
through application of existing resources that new ones can be created.
The crucial missing link between valuation and opportunity is the idiosyncratic
information and capabilities of an individual firm.  These are obviously relevant to the prospects
for profitable trading in existing markets, but more importantly, to the firm’s ability to create
entirely new resources by some combination of resource purchase and application of resources it
already has.   Barney’s brief discussion of the value of “organizational analysis” and “turning
inwardly” (Barney 1986, p. 1239) touches on the issue, but seems to understate its scope and
importance.  It is partly a matter of “turning inwardly,” but also a matter of looking outward at an
unexplored environment from a particular vantage point on the frontier.  The view of each firm is
shaped by its own existing resources and information, including its ability to assess the resources
of other firms, and is to that extent unique.  The more distinctive the view, the more likely that
such a view can encompass valuable opportunities not similarly visible to other firms – implying
at least a temporary advantage for the firm that identifies the opportunity.  Further, it is not at all
the case that the view is static, since the environment is constantly changing – and so is the firm
itself, in ways that condition what it can see and understand.  In this sense, the flow of history
continually renews each firm’s ability to identify opportunities that are differentially suited to it,
even without explicit effort to this end by the firm itself.
Combined with the above arguments, this suggests a theoretical reason why market
inefficiencies that can be capitalized upon by a firm would tend to involve internal resources.
Specifically, consider a firm with some set of idiosyncratic resources. If these resources are not
traded, the value of other resources, available outside the firm, may not reflect their use in some
combination of resources involving the idiosyncratic resources of this firm. Since this firm has
privileged information about the existence of these resources, it follows that this firm may be the
only actor who could spot this opportunity. As a result, through analysis of internal resources –
in relation to possible opportunities-- this firm may be able to spot a strategic opportunity where
other resources can be bought for a price below their rent producing capacity. Analysis of only
traded resources, however, is unlikely to turn up such strategic opportunities. Although such
resources could potentially be used in more valuable combinations with the untraded resources
of other firms, the firm does not have access to this information. In this sense, analysis of internal
resources may be a necessary, or very likely necessary, component of a successful search for
strategic opportunities.  To the extent that managers are focused on analyzing the external
opportunities without regard for whether such opportunities would involve internal resources,
this analysis suggests a different focus for strategizing efforts.
Although this analysis implies that detailed strategic guidance is necessarily specific to
the firm and its situation, the notion of serendipity does have some general prescriptive force.
While good luck may befall the inert or lazy, serendipitous discovery occurs only in the course
of an energetic quest – a quest in which lucky discoveries of an unanticipated kind  can be
recognized through alertness and then flexibly exploited.
This perspective on strategy is consistent with a large and growing body of evidence on
the relationship of firm attributes to their entry decisions, innovations and other strategic moves,
much of it recently reviewed by Helfat and Lieberman (2002) (see also Usselman 1993, Klepper
and Simons 2000).  In general, the evidence shows that opportunities are specific and firms that
seize them are usually specifically prepared for them by their “pre-history”.  This mechanism is15
the counterpart of “pre-adapation” in biological evolution (Cattani 2002). Our perspective is also
well aligned with the discussion by (Sarasvathy 2001) about the characteristics of the thought
process used by entrepreneurs. Using verbal protocols from experienced entrepreneurs faced
with a hypothetical venture problem, Sarasvathy (2001) demonstrated that the thought process of
entrepreneurs is more likely to start from the givens of a situation and to proceed by investigating
the possible effects and market opportunities that could be created with these means. Goal
directed thinking, in which a market opportunity was identified at first and the means to achieve
this opportunity were discussed later, was much less frequent.
The challenge of strategy is the challenge of assessing the opportunities that open to an
idiosyncratically positioned actor in a changing environment.  For this, the challenge of stock
picking provides a poor analogy, because in that context actor idiosyncrasy plays a much smaller
role. This assessment is clearly consistent with the central tenets of the RBV, but not with the
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